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Kozak: The NLRB's Proposed Rule on the Appropriateness of Single Locatio

THE NLRB'S PROPOSED RULE ON THE
APPROPRIATNESS OF SINGLE LOCATION
BARGAINING UNITS: CLARITY AND
PREDICTABILITY, BUT HAS
ANYTHING CHANGED?
All You'll Need is "a Calculatorand Odometer."1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act2 ("NLRA" or
"Act") to protect employees from employer attempts to disrupt union
organization and the collective bargaining process.3 The National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") was created in 1935 to implement
the federal government's labor policies embodied in the Act.' The
Board's purpose is to develop and administer a national labor policy
which protects an employee's right to unionize.'
In implementing a national labor relations policy, the Board has the
power to engage in rulemaking or adjudication.' Until recently, the
1. NLRB Chairman William B. Gould, Address to the Atlanta Bar Association (Dec. 9,1994),
in Remarks of NLRB Chairman Gould to Atlanta Bar Association, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 236,
at D-28 (Dec. 12, 1994).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994).
3. See id. § 151. Declaring that it is,
[T]he policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
Id.
4. See id. § 153(a).
5. See id. § 153. The Act mandates that
[E]mployees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities.
Id. § 157.
6. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
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Board had relied solely on adjudication,7 deciding each dispute brought
before it on a case-by-case basis.' This was true until 1987, when the
Board promulgated its first rule regarding the appropriateness of a
bargaining unit in the health care industry.9 This rule was implemented
in accord with procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure
Act l0 ("APA"), and was subsequently found to be a valid exercise of
the Board's power by the Supreme Court. ll
As a consequence of the successful implementation of the rule in the
health care arena, the Board is now seeking to implement a rule
regarding aplropriate bargaining units in other industries. On September
25, 1995, the NLRB published a notice of proposed rulemaking on the
issue of appropriate bargaining units for all employers within the Board's
jurisdiction. 12 The proposed rule spells out what the Board has determined to be the most relevant factors in deciding the appropriateness of
single location bargaining units.' 3 The rule creates a presumption that
the single location unit is the most appropriate unit, provided that three
elements are satisfied.' 4
This Note will describe the rulemaking process, and examine the
propriety of the Board's decision to promulgate a rule for single location
bargaining units. Furthermore, this Note will examine the practicality of
the proposed rule as if it were applied retroactively to Board precedent.
This Note will demonstrate that the rule is a valid means to reduce

7. See 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(b) (1995).
8. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994) (describing the adjudicatory process); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 159160 (1994) (describing the procedures available to the Board when resolving labor disputes). "
9. See 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a)-(d) (1995). The Board's rule provides that eight defined
employee units are appropriate for collective bargaining in acute care hospitals. See id. The Board
permitted three exceptions: (1) cases presenting "extraordinary circumstances," (2) cases where units
that do not comply with this rule are already in existence, and (3) cases in which labor organizations
wish to merge any of the eight units. kd
10. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994).
11. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991). The Supreme Court found that
the Board had the authority, under its broad rulemaking powers of section 6 of the NLRA, to resolve
disputes regarding appropriate bargaining units through its rulemaking power. See id.at 614. Further,
the Court found that section 9(b)'s mandate that the Board decide the appropriate unit "in each case"
should be read to mean that whenever there is a dispute between an employer and an employee
concerning the appropriateness of a bargaining unit, the Board must resolve the dispute. See id. at
611. When doing so, the Court said, the Board may rely on rules it has created to resolve issues of
general applicability. See id.
12. See Appropriateness ofRequested Single Location Bargaining Unit in Representation Cases,
60 Fed. Reg. 50,146 (1995)-(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 130.40) (proposed Sept. 25, 1995).
13. See discussion infra Part IV. .
14. See discussion infra Part IV. (describing the elements of the rule, as well as the
extraordinary circumstances exception).
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NLRB case load and expense, with little sacrifice to substantive case law.
Finally this Note reviews the Board's contention that the implementation
of this rule will not substantially alter previous rulings, and will be
advantageous for both sides of the bargaining table.
I.

THE CHOICE BETWEEN POLICYMAKING BY RULE OR
ADJUDICATION

When a government agency engages in policymaking, it does so
either by announcing it as a rule or as an order. 5 Rulemaking is the
means for the creation of a rule, 6 and adjudication is the process for
the formulation of an order. 7 The choice between these two
policymaking tools is essentially a tactical one. I"
In practice, rules have general or specific applicability, but are
designed to have a prospective effect.19 This gives targeted parties
notice of agency policy and increases the potential of reliance. Orders,
on the other hand, have a specific effect.20 They are the outcome of
administrative hearings in which all issues on a particular matter are
to specific parties, and at the same
presented and resolved with respect
2
time result in new agency policy. '
Agencies are given wide discretion to select which vehicle they will
use to advance their policies.' The Supreme Court articulated this
principle in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,23 where the Securities Exchange
Commission approved the reorganization of federal public utilities by
way of an order.24 The Court held that agencies must be allowed to use
their informed discretion to choose between acting by general rule or by
individual adjudication.2 5 It reasoned that in certain cases where the

15. See VILLIAM F. Fox, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 131 (2d ed. 1994).

16. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1994).
17. See id. § 551(7).
18. See Fox, supra note 15, at 131.

19. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994).
20. See Fox, supra note 15, at 133.
21. See Fox, supra note 15, at 133; 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)-551(7) (1994).
22. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).

23. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
24. See id. at 201.
25. See id. at 203. The Court stated that "the choice made between proceeding by general rule
or by individual, ad hoe litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the

administrative agency." Id

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

3

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 7
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:313

issue is uniquely complex and specialized, it may be impossible for an
26
agency to address the problem by a general rule.

Prior to 1974, the Supreme Court had not defined the boundaries of

27
agencies' discretion. Then, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., the Court
set forth the criteria that agencies should follow when deciding whether
to take action through rule or order.28 The Court found that an agency's
decision to announce new policy in an adjudicative proceeding is valid,
29
unless there was an abuse of discretion under Chenery. The Court
stated that an agency's decision to announce new policy will not be
permitted in an adjudicative proceeding if rulemaking is expressly
required by statute, the agency had in the past acted by rule in similar
circumstances, or when the agency intends to have its policy apply
generally over many individuals.3"
With respect to the proposed rulemaking, the NLRB is not
confronted with a unique situation in which an individual or a small
group of individuals are being affected. As an administrative agency
acting to implement national labor policy, the Board has the statutory and
3
legal authority to use its rulemaking power. '
While the Board clearly has the authority to create rules, it has
32
chosen to do so sparingly in the past. Rather, the Board has consis33
tently maintained adjudication as its primary source of policymaldng.

26. See id. at 202-03.
27. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
28. See id. at 294. The Court refused to preclude the Board from announcing new policies
through adjudication, noting that the "choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first
instance within the Board's discretion." Id. Acknowledging that the choice of one over the other may
be an abuse of discretion or a violation of the Act, the Court conceded that it is doubtful that "any
generalized standard could have more than marginal utility:' Id. (resolving that there could be no
standard mechanism for courts to review when an agency should have implemented its policies
through rulemaking or adjudication). Further, the Court pointed to the possible benefits of
rulemaking over adjudication, indicating that it could produce relevant information through the
solicitation of comments from affected parties. See id. at 295. However, the Court concluded
consistent with its premise of deference, that agency discretion would rule, noting that the
adjudication process might produce similarly relevant information, albeit by the affected parties to
each case. See id.
29. See id. at 293.
30. See id. at 294-95; see also FoX, supra note 15, at 140-41.
31. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Act specifically indicates
that the Board shall have the power to "make, amend, and rescind" rules necessary to implement the
provisions of the Act, so long as it is done in the manner proscribed by the APA. 29 U.S.C. § 156
(1994).
32. See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hidingthe Ball":NLRB Policymaking and the
FailureofJudicialReview, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 391-92 (1995).
33. See id. at 392.
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Numerous commentators have frequently criticized the wisdom of that
choice.3 4 Still, others have argued that the Board's reliance on adjudication better fits the field over which it reigns.35 Namely, the Board's sole
reliance on adjudication serves to minimize congressional and judicial
intervention in the Board's policies, and maintains a certain flexibility

that is necessary in order to maintain a politically responsive national
labor policy.36
Those who criticize the Board's infrequent use of rulemaking
condemn the Board's reliance on the adjudicative process. They argue
that "rulemaking is a more equitable process than adjudication; that
rulemaking increases the agency's access to relevant information and
facilitates future planning; and that rulemaking provides an important
political check on agency discretion."37 Further, critics have asserted
that rulemaking serves to reduce litigation over "ambiguities and

inconsistencies" in Board policies.38

Alternatively, the practice of resisting rulemaking and implementing
labor policies exclusively through adjudication allows the Board to

34. See, e.g., CongressionalOversight of Administrative Agencies (NLRB): Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Separation ofPowers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 916-18 (1968) (statement of Henry J. Friendly) (arguing that the NLRB's refusal to
implement rulemaking causes many administrative problems); Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's
Adjudication-RuleMakingDilemma Under the AdministrativeProcedure.Act,79 YALE L.J. 571,622
(1970) (maintaining that the Board might be well purposed in its exclusive use of adjudication,
"[b]ut rule making may help reinvigorate agencies now settled into dull, time-consuming, and
relatively unproductive adjudicatory routines that are unequal to growing case loads and the
increasing complexity of the areas to be regulated."); Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making
Powers of the NationalLabor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 761 (1961) (finding that the
NLRB's reliance on an ad hoc approach to policyrnaking produces grossly unsatisfactory results).
35. See generally Note, NLRB Rulemaking: PoliticalReality Versus ProceduralFairness,89
YALE L.J. 982, 984 (1980) (discussing the Board's choice as a "trade-off between administrative
flexibility and procedural fairness.").
There is a trade-off between the autonomy of the agency and the effective administration of
the Act. See Flynn, supra note 32, at 424. Straightforward policymaking by rulemaking is much less
likely to survive judicial scrutiny, than a adjudicative policy disguised in a so-called multi-factorial
fact finding approach. See Flynn, supra note 32, at 434-47 (concluding that realistically, the Court's
tendency to overreach in their review of straightforward policy determinations, even in light of
Chevron and its progeny, justifies an ambiguous approach to rulemaking in order to avoid such
judicial usurpation).
36. See Note, supra note 35, at 983-84. The Note argues that the need for flexibility in
addressing labor issues far outshines the procedural benefits of promulgated rules. See Note, supra
note 35, at 983-84.
37. Note, supra note 35, at 984. The author rejects these assertions, acknowledging that the
"issue of procedural fairness is at the core of the controversy," but maintaining that the NLRB
cannot and should not be compelled to use rulemaking against its better judgement. Note, supranote
35, at 984-85.
38. See Note, supra note 35, at 985 n.19.
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develop its rules in a form most likely to survive judicial scrutiny."
NLRB rulemaking would permit courts to interfere with the Board's

development of labor policy and have a hand in policy formulation,
thereby stifling its political responsiveness." Furthermore enhanced
flexibility through adjudication increases the chance that the national
will be responsive to industry developments and individual
labor policy
disputes.4"
Nevertheless, there have been assertions that rulemaking in
collective bargaining unit determinations would lead to greater predictability and less time and expense for both the Board and the parties.4 2
In an article entitled, Conserving Energy at the Labor Board: The Case
for Making Rules on the Collective BargainingUnits,43 Berton Subrin
outlines the advantages of rulemaking in collective bargaining unit

determinations.' Subrin predicts four major advantages which might
stem from rulemaking in this area: (1) through the rulemaking process,
the Board will become more familiar with the realities of organizing and
collective bargaining, 45 (2) neither of the parties to an action would be

39. See Note, supra note 35, at 989; Flynn, supra note 35, at 434.
40. See Flynn, supra note 32, at 433-39.
[The federal courts' record] suggests that when presented with a clear policy "target," the
courts are all too prone to substitute their views for those of the agency- deference be
damned. A central problem is that doctrines of judicial review of agency action are
extremely malleable; as with the canons of statutory construction, judges can generally
find one that gets them where they want to go. The combination of the courts' tendency
toward overreaching and these varied flexible doctrines is so lethal, according to some,
that whether the agency's policy stands or falls often turns on little more than the circuit
panel's ideological bias.
Flynn, supra note 32, at 434.
Further, it has been advanced that the Board has often modified its policies to comport with
the changing political climate. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., JudicialReview ofAgency Decisions: The
LaborBoard and the Court, 1968 Stup. Cr. REv. 53, 56-60, 64-67 (1968).
41. See Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-MakingPowers of the NationalLaborRelations
Board,70 YALE LU. 729, 758 (1961); Berton B. Subrin, Conserving Energy at the LaborBoard:
The Casefor Making Rules on Collective BargainingUnits, 32 LAB. L.J. 105, 111-12 (1981); Note,
supra note 35, at 986.
42. See Henry J. Friendly, The FederalAdministrativeAgencies: The NeedforBetterDefinition
of Standards,75 HARv. L. REv. 863, 867 (1962) (taking particular note of the NLRB's lack of
clearly defined rules); See Subrin, supra note 41, at 108-10.
43. Subrin, Conserving Energy at the Labor Board: The Casefor Making Rules on Collective
BargainingUnits, 32 LAB. L.J. 105 (1981). Berton Subrin, at the time the article was published, was
Director of the Office of Representation Appeals, National Labor Relations Board. See id. at 105.
44. See id. at 108-11.
45. See id. at 108. Subrin explored the possible advantages ofrulemaking. See id. Particularly,
he predicted that the Board will become more familiar with the "realities" of bargaining unit issues,
"[t]hrough area or national hearings on a particular industry, it would learn what has worked." Id.
Further, there would be testimony by parties on both sides of the table which could provide valuable
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confused as to which factors the Board will find critical, 46 (3) prior
knowledge on the part of unions and employers will reduce a significant
amount of time and expense caused by litigation,47 and (4) with a clear
4
rule, there will be less for parties to litigate, and more stipulations.
A.

Rulemaking in Collective BargainingUnit Determinations

The Supreme Court validated the statutory power of the NLRB to
engage in rulemaking in collective bargaining unit determinations in
American HospitalAss'n v. NLRB.49 In that case, the American Hospital
Association challenged the facial validity of the Board's rule on
appropriate bargaining units for acute care hospitals.5" Specifically, the
employer claimed that: (1) the Board did not have the authority to
engage in rulemaking in this area, (2) the rule violated a congressional
health
admonition to avoid "undue proliferation of bargaining units in the
'51
capricious."
and
"arbitrary
was
rule
the
(3)
and
industry,"
care
The Hospital Association essentially criticized the NLRB's rule as
being an arbitrary use of administrative rulemaking power.5 2 In response, the Board relied on an extensive record that it had developed
during its rulemaking process, as well as on the Board's experience in
deciding cases "during the 13-year period between the enactment of the
health care amendments and its notice of proposed rulemaking. '5 3 The
Court found that the rule was not arbitrary and capricious," and upheld

information to aid in the formulation of a standard, rather than the self-serving statements of parties
to an adjudicative hearing. See id. at 109.
46. See id. With the presently employed adjudicative process, the Board frequently recites a
litany of facts, but ultimately rests its conclusion on an "under all the circumstances" rationale. Id.
47. See id. Delayed unit determination decisions are common and do not facilitate labor
relations stability. See id.

48. See id. If more parties stipulate to which is the most appropriate collective bargaining unit,
there will be fewer cases requiring decisions by Regional Directors, the Board, and the courts. See
id. The prospective economizing effects would benefit all parties involved.

49. 499 U.S. 606 (1991).
50. See id. at 608.
51. Id. at 608-09.
52. See id. at 617-20. The hospital argued that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because
'it ignores critical differences among the more than 4,000 acute-care hospitals in the United States,
including differences in size, location, operations, and work-force organization."' Id. at 617.

53. Id. at 618.
54. See id. at 619. The Court noted: the extensive notice and comment period, the Board's
demonstration of why diversity had not affected results of previous bargaining unit determinations
in the past, and the Board's well reasoned justification of why the eight factors support

generalization. See id. at 618-19. The Court also took note of the "extraordinary circumstances"
exception. See id. at 619.
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the Board's authority under section 9(b) of the NLRA to resolve disputes

regarding appropriate units through its rulemaking authority.55

The Supreme Court's examination and subsequent validation of the
Board's health care unit rule evidenced a deference to an agency's
decision to utilize rulemaking promulgated in accordance with the APA.
Notably, the Board's successful use of rulemaking in deciding appropriate units for collective bargaining in the health care industry has
prompted an attempt to further exercise its rulemaking in other industries.
This proposed rule is the embodiment of that attempt.
B.

The Process of NLRB Rulemaking

Notice of any proposed rulemaking is required to be published in
the Federal Register.5 6 Such notice must include, "(1) a statement of the
time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference
to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the
terms or.substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects
and issues involved."5" After notice, the APA requires that the agency
promulgating the rule give all interested persons the opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking.5
The NLRB published Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
the issue of the appropriateness of the single location bargaining unit rule
in June 1994."9 Notice of proposed rulemaking, as required by the APA,

Furthermore, the Court answered American Hospital Association's criticism that this rule is
a change from the Board's previous treatment of similar issues in different industries. See id. at 618.
The Court noted that so long as a rule is based on a "reasoned analysis," the fact that the Board has
changed its position will not undermine the validity of the rule. See id. at 619; Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42, 57 (1983) (holding that where an agency
changes a rule, it must do so based on a presented "reasoned analysis" of its actions).
55. See American Hosp., 499 U.S. at 620. Section 9(b) of the Act requires that the NLRB
determine the appropriate bargaining unit in each case. See 29 C.F.R. § 159(b) (1994). Section 9(a)
of the Act provides that the representative "designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes" shall be the
exclusive bargaining representative. See 29 C.F.R. § 159(a) (1995).
56. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994) (governing agency rulemaking).

57. Id. § 553(b)(l)-(3).
58. See id.§ 553(c) (stating that all interested persons shall be able to participate, "through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.").
59. See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation
Cases, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,501 (June 2, 1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103). The Board outlined
several reasons why it was considering promulgating a rule, but specifically stated that it "has made
no decision on the propriety of any form of rulemaking in this area," and invited all interested parties
to comment. Id
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was published on September 28, 1995.60 The Board set a comment
period for interested parties who wished to submit comments on how the
Board "may best fulfill its statutory obligation to determine an appropriate unit when a single location bargaining unit is requested."6 1 The
deadline for all comments was the close of business April 12, 1996.62
Furthermore, the House Small Business Committee slated a public
hearing for March 7, 1996.63 Among the topics discussed at the hearing
were the prospective effects of the Board's proposed rulemaking on the
issue of single location bargaining units and how the proposed
rulemaking affects the competitiveness of small businesses.' As a result
of matters raised at the hearing, and requests by groups who attended, the
period to allow more organizations to voice
Board extended the comment
65
their opinions on the rule.
Both the bulk of the commentary made during the House hearing,
and the letters submitted to the NLRB, have attacked the proposed rule
as being a deviation from present Board practice and as too pro-union.66
Those in opposition to this proposal dismiss the Board's justifications for
the rule as a mere smoke screen for its blatant efforts to promote
unionization at the expense of private businesses.67

60. See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation
Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,146 (Sept. 28, 1995) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103).
61. Id.
62. See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation
Cases, 61 Fed. Reg. 10,709 (Mar. 15, 1996). The comment period initially was set to end November

27, 1995. See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation
Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. at 50,146. It was extended four times for various reasons-public requests, the
temporary government shutdown, and lack of appropriated funds. See Appropriateness of Requested
Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 61 Fed. Reg. 4,246 (Feb. 5, 1996);
Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 61 Fed.
Reg. 1546 (Jan. 22, 1996); Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in
Representation Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,319 (Nov. 27, 1995).
63. See House Panel Sets Hearing on NLRB Rulemaking, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at

D-20 (Feb. 1, 1996).
64. See id.
65. See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation
Cases, 61 Fed. Reg. at 10,709.
66. See NLRB: Gould Responds to Republican Charges on Proposed Single Facility Rule, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 74, at D-4 (Apr. 17, 1996).

67. See id.
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THE BOARD'S MOTIVATION TO PROMULGATE THIS RULE

Questions regarding appropriate bargaining units are decided by a
case-by-case adjudication process where the Board examines the facts of
each case and determines the appropriate bargaining unit.68 The Board
recognizes a presumption that the single plant unit is the appropriate
unit.69 This presumption is based on Board decisions which note that
section 9(b) of the NLRA lists the single plant unit as one of the units
appropriate for collective bargaining.70 The presumption, however, is
rebuttable. To determine whether the presumption has been rebutted, the
Board will look at the degree of central control over day-to-day
operations and labor relations; similarities in skills; functions and
working conditions; the amount of employee interchange; the distance
between locations; and any relevant bargaining history.7"
The Board's efforts to promulgate a rule on single location
bargaining units stem from its desire to codify those factors which it
feels to be the most determinative.7 2 The rulemakers contend that much
of the current litigation concerning appropriate bargaining units is fueled
by parties' attempts to persuade the Board of the existence of certain
facts or factors which the parties' believe will be determinative.73 The
purpose of the proposed rule, "is to let the public and practitioners know
74
what is required for a single location unit to be found appropriate."
The Board advanced this new rule with the hopes that it will reduce the
amount of bargaining unit determination litigation and facilitate more
efficient use of Board resources.7'
68. See Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629, 631 (1962); see also infra note 83 and
accompanying text (developing a presumption favoring single location bargaining units).
69. See Dixie Belle Mills, 139 N.L.R.B. at 631.
70. See id. at 631 nA; 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994).
71. See J & L Plate, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 429 (1993); Dixie Belle Mills, 139 N.L.R.B. at 630-31
(1962).
72. See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation
Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,146, at 50,149 (Sept. 28, 1995). Litigants will no longer have to attempt to
persuade the Board that certain facts exist, and argue the meaning ofthose facts, not knowing which
will be determinative. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 50,147. Nevertheless, that the Board will continue to decide new or unusual cases by
adjudication through the extraordinary circumstances exception. See id.
75. See id. The Board predicts that with a codified bright-line rule, labor organizations and
employers alike will be in a more knowledgeable position to negotiate, and there will likely be more
bargaining unit stipulations. See id. at 50,149. The Board maintains that "knowing in advance what
facts are determinative will eliminate much of the confusion and uncertainty inherent in the current
approach." Id.
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IV. THE RULE
The proposed rule is a synthesis of factors the Board has found to
be determinative in deciding the appropriateness of single location units.
As proposed, the new rule would be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103.40.76
The rule would apply to all employers over which the Board has
jurisdiction, with three exceptions."
The rule declares that an unrepresented single location unit will be
found apprppriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, provided:
(1) [t]hat 15 or more employees in the requested unit are employed at
that location,
(2) [t]hat no other location of the employer is located within one mile
of the requested locafion, and
(3) [t]hat a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
National Labor Relations Act is present at the requested location for a
regular and substantial period.78

The rule, as proposed, contains an "extraordinary circumstances"
exception. This exception renders the rule inapplicable in extreme
cases.79 Although the burden is on the labor organization to establish
that the aforementioned elements exist for the rule to apply, the employer
may show, by an offer of proof, that the elements are not satisfied or that
extraordinary circumstances exist."0 Where one of the elements is not

76. See id. at 50,157-58.
77. See id.at 50,157. Excepted industries include: "public utilities; employers engaged primarily
in the construction industry; and employers in the maritime industry in regard to their ocean-going
vessels." Id.
78. Id. at 50,157-58.

79. See id. at 50,158. Extraordinary circumstances will be found to exist if
10 percent or more of the unit employees have been temporarily transferred to other
facilities of the employer for 10 percent or more of their time during the 12 month period
preceding the filing of a petition for an election, or where no petition for election has
been filed during the 12 month period preceding either the demand for recognition or the
time when a bargaining obligation would arise.

Id.
80. See id. at 50,156. Although the exception provides a means for an employer to escape the
reaches of the rule, the Board has declared that, like the health care rule, it is "our intent to construe

the extraordinary circumstances exception narrowly, so that it does not provide an excuse,
opportunity, or 'loophole' for redundant or unnecessary litigation and the concomitant delay that
would ensue." Id.
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fulfilled, or an extraordinary circumstance exists, the Board will decide
the unit determination by adjudication."'
V. MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS OF CASE LAW FOLLOWING THE

REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
In addressing the question of whether the requested single location
has been rebutted, the Board has taken a number of
presumption
unit
factors into consideration. The Board, over the years, has created "rules"
of general applicability82 under which it will presume the single facility
unit to be the most appropriate collective bargaining unit.
With its decision in Dixie Belle Mills, Inc.,83 the Board began to
84
develop a presumption favoring single location bargaining units.
Because a single plant unit is listed in section 9(b) of the NLRA as an
appropriate unit, the Board concluded that, the single unit would be
85
presumptively appropriate even if there was a more appropriate unit.
The Board noted that the presumption will remain intact if there is no
evidence that the single bargaining unit is inappropriate.86 Even where
evidence is presented to rebut the presumption, however, the Board may
still find the single location bargaining unit to be the appropriate unit.
For example, in Dixie Belle Mills, the Board was forced to decide
whether the appropriate unit included both the employer's manufacturing

81. See id. at 50,158.
82. See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units, 60 Fed. Reg. at
50,149; Health Care Industry, Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,338 (1989) (noting that the Board
has long made use of those "rules" of general applicability with regards to bargaining unit determinations).
83. 139 N.L.R.B. 629 (1962).
84. See id. at 631; Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 877 (1968). In Haag,the Board extended the
rule, noting that the single location unit furthers certain policy considerations outlined in the NLRA.
See id. at 877. The Board in Haag found that the purpose of section 9(b) is to, "assure employees
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act" and that the single location
bargaining unit furthers this purpose. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988)). If there has been no
evidence to "destroy the separate identity" of the unit, then the single location unit provides the
employees' "fullest freedom." HaagDrug, 169 N.L.R.B. at 877.
85. See Dixie Belle Mills, 139 N.L.R.B. at 631.
86. See id. The question presented in unit determination cases is whether the requested unit is
an appropriate one, not whether it is the most appropriate one. See id. The Act does not require that
the bargaining unit approved by the Board is the only appropriate unit, or even the most appropriate
one; all that is required is that the unit be an appropriate unit. See Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v.
NLRB, 705 F.2d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1983); NLRB v. J.C. Penney Co., 620 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir.
1980); Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 877 (1968); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418
(1950).
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plant and warehouse, or each entity separately." The Board found that
the facts did not show "such a degree of integration," or "merger of
operations" so as to require a rejection of the requested single location
unit.as The Board determined that while the operations of these two
entities were integrated to the extent that they involved management
planning, procurement and sales, coordination and allocation of materials
and equipment and personnel and accounting services, all other functions
were done through separate operations.89
Through years of adjudication on this issue, the Board has identified
factors which it claims to consider when determining whether or not the
employer has succeeded in rebutting the single unit presumption. The
Board has indicated, for example, that it looks to such factors as: prior
bargaining history, the geographic proximity to other facilities of the
same employer, the degree of day-to-day managerial responsibility
exercised by the branch facility management, the frequency of employee
interchange, and whether the requested single-facility unit constitutes a
homogeneous, identifiable, and distinct employee grouping.90
In formulating the proposed nile, the Board looked to the aforementioned indicia in determining whether or not to rebut the presumption. 91
This "multi-factorial approach" was utilized in the Board's decision in
J & L Plate.92 In that case, the Board found that the employer's policies
regarding wages and benefits were centrally controlled, that the manufacturing operations were functionally integrated, and that job classifications
and qualifications were similar.93 Nevertheless, these conditions were
insufficient to rebut the single location unit presumption.94

87. See DixieBelle Mills, 139 N.L.R.B. at 630.
88. See id. at 632. The Board concluded that where a unit had not been so functionally
integrated, or so effectively merged into a more comprehensive unit, so as to lose its separate
identity-the single location unit will be presumed to be the appropriate unit. See id. at 631.

89. See id. at 630-31.
90. J & L Plate, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 429 (1993); General Mills Restaurants, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B.
908, 910 (1990); Haag Drug, 169 N.L.R.B. at 877-80; Kapok Tree Inn, 232 N.L.RB. 702, 703
(1977); see also Esco Corp., 298 N.L.R.B. 837, 839 (1990) (including among the relevant factors:
"the extent of local autonomy; similarity of the employee skills, functions, and working conditions;
degree of employee interchange; distance between locations; and bargaining history, if any.").
91. See generally Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in
Representation Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,146,50,152-55 (1995) (identifying factors noted by the Board
in prior single location cases, and revealing the origin of the proposed rule).

92. 310 N.L.R.B. 429 (1993); see Esco, 298 N.L.R.B. at 839; Bowie Hall Trucking, 290
N.L.R.B. 41, 42 (1988); Sol's, 272 N.L.R.B. 621 (1984); Gray Drug Stores, 197 N.L.R.B. 924, 925
(1972); Dixie Belle Mills, 139 N.L.R1B. at 631.

93. See J & L Plate, 310 N.L.R.B. at 429.
94. See id.
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By refusing to rebut the presumption, the Board rejected the
employer's argument that the union had not offered evidence of local
autonomy in the day-to-day operations." The Board found that the
burden was on the employer to rebut the single unit presumption by
introducing evidence which demonstrated a lack of autonomy.9 6 The
decision considered the presumption to be more compelling than mere
evidence of centralized control and functional integration.97 In J & L
Plate, the Board categorized the evidence as insufficient to rebut the
single location unit presumption, even though some evidence indicated
that a multi-plant unit might have been appropriate."
The Board further elaborated on the factors it deemed material in
99
resolving bargaining unit disputes in GeneralMills Restaurants, Inc.00
In arriving at its decision, the Board applied the relevant factors.
Specifically, the average distance between the restaurants was seven
miles,' O and there was no history of collective bargaining.0 2 Further,
the Board found little evidence of employee interchange, and any that did
occur was found to be voluntary, and done as a matter of convenience
for employees rather than as a condition of employment.'0 3 Permanent
transfers only occurred eleven times within a combined work force of
185 employees.1" 4 The Board also indicated that the local general
managers retained sufficient authority at the individual locations to

95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. The Board noted that it is the burden of the party opposing the unit to present
evidence to overcome the presumption. See id.; GeneralMills Restaurants,300 N.L.R.B. at 910-11.
Furthermore, the Regional Director had "erred by construing the absence of evidence regarding local
autonomy (i.e., ihat the record was supposedly silent) as being the equivalent of affirmatively
presenting evidence to rebut that presumption." J & L Plate, 310 N.L.R.B. at 429.
98. See J & L Plate, 310 N.L.R.B at 430. The Board concluded that, "on the balance the
evidence presented does not establish that the J & L plant has been 'so effectively merged into a
more comprehensive unit,or is so functionally integrated that it has lost its separate identity."' Id.
(quoting Esco Corp., 298 N.L.R.B. 837, 839 (1990) (citing Dixie Belle Mills, 139 N.L.R.B. 629,631

(1962)).
99. 300 N.L.R.B. 908 (1990).
100. See J & L Plate, 310 N.L.R.B. at 429; General Mills Restaurants,300 N.L.R.B. at 910;
Haag Drug, 169 N.L.R.B. at 877-80; Kapok Tree Inn, 232 N.L.R.B. at 703; Esco, 298 N.L.R.B. at
839.

101. See id. at 908:
102. See id. at 911.

103. See id.
104. See id. Moreover, the Board noted that permanent transfers are less indicative of actual

interchange. See id.
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support the presumption. '°5 The Board gave no clear indication
that one
16
factor was more determinative than any of the others.
Significantly, the Board held that even though there were employee
transfers among the various restaurant locations, and there was centralized administration, the single facility unit was appropriate. 0 7 Furthermore, the Board reiterated that the presence of a general manager at each
location'whose responsibilities were to supervise the day-to-day activities
of the employees, rate employee job performance, and affect employee
job status was sufficient to support a single location unit.'
A.

The New Rule Will Not Significantly Disturb Single Location
BargainingUnit Precedent

When drafting the proposed rule, the Board was forced to discern
which factors were truly determinative in finding the appropriate
bargaining unit. 1°9 Specifically, the Board selected temporary employee
interchange, geographic proximity, local autonomy, and unit size as the
most determinative factors for consideration." 0 Although the Board has
summarily omitted factors which it had previously noted to be determinative in past single location unit cases, the omissions will likely not
substantially altered the results in single location bargaining unit cases.
The factors the NLRB omitted from the proposed rule include:
functional integration, centralized control, common skills, permanent
transfers, and bargaining history.' Admittedly, although these factors
have been excluded, Board decisions which have used these criterion in

105. See id. Despite the centralized management system, the Board found that the general
managers at the individual Red Lobster's retained sufficient authority to support the single facility
presumption. See id.Even though there were limitations placed on their authority by corporate policy
and area supervisors, the Board found that the general manager remained responsible for the day-today management of the store. See id.
106. See generally id. (identifying factors which the Board considered in upholding the
presumption, yet not indicating that any one factor is more indicative of sufficiently integrated units

which might rebut the presumption).
107. See id. at 912.
108. See id. (citing Penn Color, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 1117, 1119 (1980)).
109. See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation
Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,146 (Sept. 28, 1995).
110. See id. at 50,154-56.
111. See id.at 50,146.
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different outcomes if they were decided under
the past would not have
1 12
the current proposal.
Although functional integration and centralized management are two
elements which the Board has considered in past unit determinations,
Moreover,. the Board has
they were not singularly determinative.'
found that evidence of the above two elements, without more, will not
be enough to overcome the presumption of the appropriateness of the
single unit." 4 In Courier Dispatch, for example, despite evidence of
16 among the
functional integration.. and centralized supervision'
employer's New England facilities, the Board looked only to those
7
primary determinative factors identified in the rule."
In Courier Dispatch, the Board specifically identified employee
interchange as a "critical factor" which cannot be clearly established by
mere integration." 8 Furthermore, the fact that the individual facilities
each had a local supervisor, who was responsible for the day-to-day
operation of the unit, was not overshadowed by the existence of a
9
regional director who had some control over personnel." In Courier
Dispatch, the Board highlighted the geographic distance between the
facilities and the lack of significant employee interchange as particularly
factors in finding that the presumption had not been
determinative
120
rebutted.

112. See Courier Dispatch Group, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 728 (1993); J& L Plate, 310 N.L.R.B. at
430; Esco, 298 N.L.R.B. at 839; Hegins Corp., 255 N.L.RIB. 1236, 1237 (1981); Penn Color, 249
N.L.R.B. 1117, 1118 (1980); Black and Decker Mfg., 147 N.L.R.B. 825, 828 (1964).
113. See Courier Dispatch Group, 311 N.L.IRB. at 728.
114. See id. at 728; J & L Plate,310 N.L.R.B. at 430; Esco, 298 N.L.R.B. at 840; Hegins, 255
N.L.R.B. at 1236; Penn Color,249 N.L.R.B. at 1118; Black and Decker, 147 N.L.R.B. at 828.
115. See Courier Dispatch Group, 311 N.L.R.B. at 731.
116. See id. The Board agreed with the employer that administrative and personnel functions
were centralized in that the ultimate responsibility for the fate of the employee was decided at a
regional level. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. The Board refused to apply significant weight to facts which suggested some
employee interchange evidenced by occasional employee back-up and brief substitutions. See id. at
731-32; Bowie Hall Trucking, 290 N.L.R.B. 41, 43 n.l 1 (1988); cf Dayton Transport Corp., 270
N.L.R.B. 1114, 1115-16 (1984).
119. See CourierDispatch Group, 311 N.L.R.B. at 731 (citing Penn Color, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B.
1117, 1119 (1980) (finding that where the plant managers "handle the day-to-day supervision of their
employees, we find this more significant in determining the appropriateness of the unit sought than
the existence of central record-keeping or product integration.')); Rezetti's Market, 238 N.L.R.B.
174, 176 (1978); Haag Drug, 169 N.L.R.B. at 878 (1968); Black & Decker Mfg., 147 N.L.R.B. at
828 (1964).
120. Courier Dispatch Group, 311 N.L.R.B. at 731-32 (1993); see also Bowie Hall Trucking,
290 N.L.R.B. at 43 (1988); United Artists Comm., 280 N.L.R.B. 1056, 1064 (1986).
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The outcome in this case would likely be the same if the proposed
bargaining unit rule is applied. The facts of CourierDispatch satisfy the
following elements that the proposed rule requires: geographic distance,121 the presence of a statutory supervisor,'2 and the requisite
number of employees.2 2 There was also insufficient evidence to prove
significant employee interchange to qualify under the extraordinary
circumstances exception. 24 In short, this decision would not likely be
disturbed by the implementation of this rule.
Among the other factors which the Board has considered in past
bargaining unit determinations, but which it has not chosen to include in
the proposed rulemaking are: permanent transfers, bargaining history,
centralized control, and functional integration. Though it seems that lipservice has been given to these factors in the past, the Board has failed
to find any of these alone to be sufficient to rebut the single unit
presumption.
Where the union or the employer has challenged the appropriateness
of the current bargaining unit,"z the Board has looked to past bargaining history to determine whether the current unit is still appropriate. 26
It seems clear that where a unit is unrepresented, bargaining history
should not play a substantial role in determining the appropriateness of
the employee requested single location unit.
For example, the Board's decision in Rock-Tenn Co., 2 7 demonstrated that a finding of a rich bargaining history is not solely determinative in a unit clarification case.128 In Rock-Tenn, a single plant unit was
found to be the only appropriate unit, despite a fifteen year collective
bargaining history as a two-plant unit.'29 Again, as in the original
representation cases, the Board looked to more determinative factors to

121. Courier Dispatch Group, 311 N.L.R.B. at 729. The distances between the facility in
question and the employer's other facilities were 238 miles, 103 miles, 93 miles, 43 miles, 40 miles,
and 38 miles. See id.

122. See id.
123. See id. at 730. The employer had fifteen drivers who were based at the requested facility.
See id.
124. See id. at 730-31. The evidence offered at the adjudicative proceeding seemed to indicate
that there had not been enough interchange in order to meet the "10 percent of employees for 10
percent of the time" exception. See id.
125. See generally id. at 731.

126. See Washington Post Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 168, 169 (1981); A.D.T. Co., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B.

704, 704-05 (1969); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Eng'rs, 145 N.L.R.B. 1521, 1524

(1964).
127. 274 N.L.R.B. 772 (1985).
128. See id. at 773.
129. Id.
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30
indicate appropriateness of the bargaining unit. The Board found the
fact that there was no interchange among the employees of the two
facilities, and that there was individual plant autonomy by way of
separate plant
decentralized labor relations control in the hands of
31
determinative.'
be
to
managers and personnel officers
The proposed rule would not apply in this instance, because it was
a unit clarification action. The Board's dismissal of the importance of
bargaining history in a unit clarification case, however, seems to indicate
that the Board would also downplay its .importance in deciding an
132
original representation action. The "compelling circumstances"' which
were found to supersede the weight of the bargaining history have been
included in the elements of the proposed rule.
the
In Batesville Casket CO.,133 the Board was again faced with
34 The
issue of whether or not a multi-plant unit was still appropriate.'
Board refused to find a single unit appropriate in a unit clarification
action where the determinative factors, as identified in the proposed
rulemaking did not exist. 135 Because the employer had not presented
sufficient evidence of a substantial recent change in the bargaining unit,
the Board refused to hold that the single location unit was the only
appropriate one. 36 There, again, the Board considered proof of a
relationship, yet found that it was not
longstanding collective bargaining
37
determinative.
singularly
Although neither Rock-Tenn, nor Batesville Casket would have
fallen within the proposed rule, both cases depict the Board's refusal to
give significant weight to bargaining history in light of the more
determinative elements which the Board has integrated into its proposed
rule. With regards to the absence of permanent transfers, the Board

130. See id. at 773.
131. See id. The Board found significant changes in the organizational structure and operation
of the companies two facilities that negated any community of interest that might have existed
previously among the two plants, and that such constituted "compelling circumstances" for
disregarding the bargaining history. Id.
132. Id. (citing Crown Zellerbach Corp., 246 N.L.R.B. 202,204 (1979) (finding that where there
are "compelling circumstances," the bargaining history may be overlooked)); see CapehartFarnsworth Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 800, 802 (1955) ("Although we accord great weight to collective
bargaining history, we do not regard it as determinative in deciding the appropriateness of a multiplant unit ....");cf.Mennen Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 355, 356 (1954) (noting that the production and
warehousing operations were carried on at different locations several miles apart).
133. 283 N.L.R.B. 795 (1987).
134. Id. at 796.

at 797.
135. See id.
136. See id.

137. See id.
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recently clarified that temporary interchange has proven to be much more
significant in determining if the presumption that a single location
bargaining unit is appropriate.' 38
Two other factors which have in the past been considered in
bargaining unit determination, but which have been left out of the
proposed rule are centralized control and functional integration. The
importance of these two elements, however, has also been minimized by
the Board in the past. 139 In Haag Drug, for example, the Board
acknowledged that there was a high degree of both centralized administration as well as integration in the retail chain industry. 40 The Board,
however, found "little significance" in these factors for "determining
whether or not the employees at a single location comprise an appropriate unit for bargaining.' 14' Rather, the Board's determination focused
on control of the day to day matters of the individual locations, and
whether there was someone on the premises who had sufficient control
thereof.42
B. Board Decisions That Might Be Disturbed
There are cases in which it appears that the result would be different
if decided in accordance with the proposed rule. Nevertheless, despite a
slight departure from Board precedent in a few instances, the proposed
rule would present minimal disturbance to settled case law.
In Globe FurnitureRentals,143 for example, the Board ruled that
a multi-store unit was the only appropriate unit where the shortest
distance between the five stores was two miles, and the farthest distance
was twenty five miles."4 Each store had a manager who had some

138. See Sol's, 272 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1984); GeneralMills Restaurants, 300 N.L.R.B. at 911
(1990). In GeneralMills Restaurants, the Board even took note that permanent transfers are not a
significant indication of actual employee interchange. See id.
139. See, e.g., HaagDrug, 169 N.L.RLB. at 878 (1968); CourierDispatch Group, 311 N.L.R.B.

at 728 (1993) (finding that despite evidence of centralized administration, offered by the employer,
the lack of evidence of overlapping supervision and transfers was determinative in holding that the
single unit presumption had not been rebutted).

140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See id.The Board specifically indicated, that despite the presence of some degree of
centralized control and integration, "it is clear that no factors are present to rebut the presumption
of the appropriateness of the single-store unit." Id at 879.
143. 298 N.L.R.B. 288 (1990).

144. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

19

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 7
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:313

Although this case appears
control over the day-to-day operations.
unit, a closer examination
single
a
as
rule
as though it would fit into the
of the Board's reasoning indicates that it might not.
The Board found the degree of autonomy of the local managers to
be inconsequential with respect to labor relations and personnel policies
and procedures.' 46 From the evidence provided, it was questionable
whether local managers, who had as little authority as the managers in
Globe Furniture Rentals, could be considered supervisors under the
Act.47 Notwithstanding the supervisory status of the local managers,1 48 the Board's primary justification for rebutting the single unit
interchange.1 49
presumption was the significant degree of employee
Because the evidence demonstrated that there was no geographic
proximity, operational centralization, local autonomy, or substantial
employee interchange, the employees at the requested location were not
so distinct and separate as to warrant the establishment of a separate
unit. so
Applying the proposed rule to the seemingly contradictory holding
in Globe FurnitureRentals, it becomes evident that the outcome would
probably have been the same. Although there was not sufficient evidence
to determine whether the employees would have been able to show that
the local managers were statutory supervisors, it seems fairly certain that
there was sufficient employee interchange for the exception to have
applied. Significantly, the employer presented evidence that there had
been seventy-seven temporary and permanent transfers in the two years
prior to the action."' Many more transfers which were too temporary
to have been documented, because they did not cross over5 2 payroll
periods, also took place between the employers five locations. Where
Globe Furniture Rentals employed a total of seventy-five unit employees

145. See id. at 289.
146. See id. at 289. All policies concerning wage, hours, and terms and conditions of

employment were formulated by regional directors and personnel managers who controlled all five
stores. See id.

147. See infra text accompanying note 170.

be
148. The Board concedes that the managers possess little or no actual authority, and could
289-90.
at
N.L.R.B.
298
Rentals,
Furniture
Globe
See
supervisors.
statutory
considered at best
149. See id. In fact, the Board stated, "we find that the record evidence shows a substantial and
significant amount of employee interchange." Id. at 290.
150. Id.

151. See id. at 290.
152. See id.
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at its five locations,'5 3 it seems most likely that the exception to the
proposed rule would have applied to this case.
Another case which seemingly provides a problem for proponents
of the proposed rule is NLRB v. Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs,
Inc."5 In that case, the Seventh Circuit reviewed Board decisions with
regard to the single location presumption. 5 5 With respect to Saxon
Paints,the court set aside the Board's bargaining order, holding that the
single store unit determination was arbitrary and unreasonable.5 6
The court held that the Board erred when it determined the most
relevant factors.' 57 It found evidence which indicated that Saxon Paints
was highly integrated,' 58 and that personnel, labor related policies, and
actual operations were centrally located.'
Furthermore, evidence
indicated that there was frequent temporary transfer of employees, as
well as a history of collective bargaining."6
Finally, and perhaps most determinative, was the court's conclusion
that the local store managers had little, if any, authority.' 6 ' The local
store manager had absolutely no authority with regard to any labor
relations and was subject to complete detailed instructions from the

153. See id. at 288.
154. 567 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977).
155. The court reviewed two Board decisions, Saxon Paints and Chicago Health Clubs. See id.
at 336, 339. For purposes of relevant analysis, this note will address the court's review of only the
Saxon Paints ruling.
156. See Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs, 567 F.2d at 339. Board determinations are subject to
limited judicial review. See id.at 335. The court must determine whether the Board's unit determinations were unreasonable, NLRB v. Krieger-Ragsdale & Co., 379 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1967);
whether they were arbitrary or capricious, StateFarm, 411 F.2d at 358; or whether they were lacking
the support of substantial evidence, NLRB v. Pinkerton's Inc., 416 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1969).
157. See Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs, 567 F.2d at 336 (noting that the Board placed too
much weight on the role of the local store manager).
158. See id. at 336. All the stores sell the same things, the layout of each store is similar, and
they run the same sales and promotions. See id. With respect to the integration of their operations,
"the stores are 'as much alike in this respect as peas in a pod."' Id. (quoting NLRB v. Frisch's Big
Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 356 F.2d 895, 896 (7th Cir. 1966)).
159. See Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs, 567 F.2d at 336.
160. See id. at 338.
161. See id. at 337. The store manager's involvement in labor relations and personnel matters
was severely limited. See id. The manager had no authority to
(a) hire new employees; (b) grant promotions, wage increases or changes in job
classifications; (c) discharge or suspend employees for disciplinary reasons; (d) lay-off
employees; (e) handle employee grievances; (f) grant requests for vacations or leaves of
absence; (g) permanently or temporarily transfer between any of the stores; and (h) post
the weekly work schedule without prior approval by the district manager.
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central office. 62 Based on these conclusions, the appellate court found
6 3 The court resolved, "it is
that the Board erred in its judgement
apparent that there is no local autonomy among the individual stores and
to resolve issues which would
that the store managers lack the authority
64
bargaining."'
be subject to collective
'Big Boy, 65
The court analogized the Saxon Paint case to Frisch
where in a similar factual scenario, the court determined that the
66
individual restaurants lacked sufficient autonomy.' In Frisch's Big
Boy, as in Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs, the single store unit was
found inappropriate because the local managers were not involved in any
significant elements of employment relations and could not affect
67
employees in the "context of collective bargaining."'
The court in Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs seemingly gave weight
16
to factors not included in the proposed rulemaking. They considered
functional integration, similarity of wages and working conditions,
69
centralized management, and bargaining history. The court, however,
was careful to note that it found no single factor determinative,'
implying, rather that it gave equal weight to all elements considered. On
its face, this case seems to devalue the proposed rule, as it considered
certain factors not included in the proposed rulemaking.
Be that as it may, the outcome in Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs
would probably be no different under the new rule as proposed. Applying
the elements to the facts of this case demonstrates that the petitioners
would likely not be able to fulfiil all of the requirements. Although, the
employee interchange extraordinary circumstances exception will likely
not apply, the lack of local autonomy through a statutory supervisor will
keep the rule from attaching. In overturning the Board's decision, the
court indicated that it felt that the Board had substantially "exaggerated
71
the control exercised by the store manager."' Moreover, based on
their total lack of impact on labor relations, the local managers in the
Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs case, will likely not be proven to be

162. See id.
163. See id.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.; see NLRB v. Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 356 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 1966).
Frisch'sBig Boy, 356 F.2d at 897.
See Chicago Health & Tennis Club, 5,,7 F.2d at 339.
Chicago Health & Tennis Club, 567 F.2d at 339; see Frisch's Big Boy, 356 F.2d at 897.
See Chicago Health & Tennis Club, 567 F.2d at 336-39.
See id.
See id. at 335 (citing State Farm Mut., 411 F.2d at 358).
Id. at 336.
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supervisors within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act.'72 Therefore, where the petitioner will not be able to provide proof of the
existence of each of the elements of the proposed rule, the case would
be decided by adjudication and the result would be the same.
VI.

IS THE RULE PRO-UNION?

Some critics have classified the rule as pro-union and slanted against
the employer. This revelation is no more surprising than that of previous
commentators who have accused the NLRB of implementing primarily
pro-union policies. 73 It is quite obvious that smaller bargaining units
are preferred given the Board's already existing precedent. 74 Furthermore, it is accepted for the most part, that unions prefer, and employers
dislike smaller units,

75

because they are both easier to organize'76

and facilitate effective collective bargaining. 177 Therefore, rules which
favor smaller units are considered to be pro-organizational, or pro8
union. 17

172. See id.at 336 (stating that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the store
manager possesses autonomy and authority over the operations of the store); section 2(11) defines
a "supervisor" as
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees,
or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of
a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgement.
29 U.S.C. § 153(11) (1994).
173. See Joan Flynn, The Costs andBenefits of "Hidingthe Ball": NLRB Policymakingand the
Failureof JudicialReview, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1995).
174. The very nature of the presumption is to assure that even where another unit might be more
appropriate, when requested, the single unit will be granted. See discussion supra Part V.
175. See Flynn, supra note 173, at 402.
176. See Flynn, supra note 173, at 403 (citing ROBERT A. GORMAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR
LAW 67-68 (1976)); Christine G. Cooper & Nancy J. Brent, The Nursing Profession and the Right
to SeparateRepresentation, 58 CEH.-KENT L. REv. 1053, 1063 (1982); see also Note, The National
Labor Relations Board's ProposedRules on Health Care BargainingUnits, 76 VA. L. REV. 115,
121 (1990) (noting that unions have noticeably greater success in elections when the units are small).
177. See Flynn, supra note 173, at 403 (citing American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651
(7th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 499 U.S. 606 (1991)). In American Hospital, Judge Posner explained the
reason that unions prefer smaller units is because they are easier to organize, as it is easier to get
members of the unit to agree on a mutually advantageous course of collective bargaining. Diversity
among the proposed unit makes it more likely that conflicts of interest will develop, and it could be
substantially more difficult to gain majority support, or having gained it, to bargain effectively. See
Flynn, supra note 172, at 403 n.67, (citing American Hosp., 899 F.2d at 654).
178. See Flynn, supra note 173, at 403.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 7
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:313

Such a determination, however, is inconsequential in evaluating the
viability of the proposed rule. The NLRB was created to implement 179a
in the NLRA.
national labor policy guided by the structure set forth
As such, the Board is directed to find a bargaining unit "appropriate for
0
the purposes of collective bargaining,"' which "assures the employee
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed" by the
8
This language can, and has been, read to suggest that the
NLRA."'
Board should find, where requested, smaller units as opposed to larger
ones."8 Therefore, the fact that the proposed rule might favor unions,
in favoring the finding of smaller units, is inconsequential as to whether
Board should promulgate a rule in this area.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Board has the authority under the APA and the NLRA to
promulgate rules which facilitate the implementation of Board policy."' 3 Specifically, the Board has the power to make rules regarding
4
appropriate single location bargaining units."
The proposed rule provides clear-cut lines along which labor
organizations and employers will be able to establish, without litigation,
the appropriate bargaining unit in a given situation. Furthermore, with the
maintenance of adjudication in new, extraordinary, and unusual
circumstances, the rule as proposed will result in little, if any, deviation
from established Board precedent.
The proposed rule has met with significant opposition from those
who advance that this is just another area where the Board is sacrificing
the interests of private business in order to advance those of unionization.
While this is not entirely false, this position is futile in lieu of the
NLRB's current predicament in this era of government downsizing and
limited resources. More NLRB rulemaking is inevitable.
The mere fact that this rule might advance the interests of unions as
it favors single location units, seems immaterial. The proposed rule,

179. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1994).
180. Id. § 159(b).
181. Id.
182. See Flynn, supra note 173, at 403 (citing American Hosp., 899 F.2d at 654); see also
Cooper & Brent, supra note 176, at 1064 (reasoning that because greater homogeneity of employee
interests effectuates the rights to organize and bargain collectively, which are guaranteed by the Act,
the Board's preference for smaller units fulfills the mandate of section 9(b)).
183. See supra notes 15-48 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
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which was properly formulated and presented for public comment, will
not be held to be arbitrary and capricious. Further, in light of the pending
appropriations bill, it is highly unlikely that opposition to this rule will
have to resort to challenging the proposal on legal grounds. 18
In a world of special interest politics, however, it is not surprising
that this issue will be decided on capital hill. Such a resolution may or
may not be proper in this instance. Yet with the Board's legal authority
to promulgate a rule in this area validated by the Supreme Court via
American HospitalAss'n, those opposed to Board rulemaking may not
be so lucky in the future as to have Congress come to the rescue by
administering the all powerful pocket book veto to supersede this
agency's initiative.
JonathanM. Kozak

185. With the end of the comment period, opponents of the rule were elated to see the
introduction of an appropriations bill which specifically identified the Board's proposal. See H.R.
3755, 104th Cong. (1996). Included in the budget bill are funds appropriated to the NLRB, provided
"[t]hat none of the funds made available by this Act shall be used in any way to promulgate a final
rule (altering 29 C.F.R. part 103) regarding single location bargaining units in representation cases."
Id.
At the time of the publication of this Note the budget bill which included the above provision
had passed in the House, 142 CONG. REc. H7475 (July 11, 1996), and was being considered by the
Senate. See 142 CoNG. REc. D928 (Sept. 12, 1996).
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